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DO DIFFERENCES IN PLEADING STANDARDS CAUSE
FORUM SHOPPING IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS?:
DOCTRINAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
JAMES

D. Cox*

RANDALL S. THOMAS**
LYNN BAI***
Federal appellate courts have promulgated divergent legal standards
for pleading fraud in securities fraud class actions after the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Recently, the Supreme Court of
the United States issued a decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd. that could have resolved these differences, but did not do so.
This Paper provides two significant contributions. We first show that
Tellabs avoids deciding the hard issues that confront courts and litigants
daily in the wake of the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard. As a
consequence, the opinion keeps very much alive the circuits' disparate
interpretations of the PSLRA's fraud pleading standard. To be sure, Tellabs
might ultimately be applied by lower courts to narrow the range of
permissible approaches to satisfying the strong inference standard, but
leaves a good deal of room within which wide variations in approach will
continue. Our second contribution is empirical in that we seek to answer the
question: do plaintiffs' attorneys take advantage of the differences among
the circuits' interpretation of the pleading standard to select more favorable
venues to file their cases, as some scholars have claimed? We find that 85
percent of the securities fraud class actions in our sample are filed in the
home circuit of the defendant corporation. While we find that the
differences in the circuits' pleading standards do not have a statistically
significant impact on the plaintiffs' choice of venue, we find that plaintiffs
are more likely to file low-value cases in jurisdictions other than the one in
which the defendant's headquarters is located.
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INTRODUCTION

Access to justice has long been a feature not only of American
civil procedure, but also American society. We find its impact nearly
everywhere we look in the law, whether it be permissive class-action
procedures, contingency-fee arrangements, or the American rule on
who pays for the costs of a misdirected lawsuit. Even the dry subject of
pleading reflects our belief that plaintiffs should not be hobbled in
getting their grievance before the judge and jury. Thus, in 1938,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 8 broke with the common law's
fact-specific pleading requirements so as to "ensure litigants have their
day in court." 1 Simply stated, notice pleading's primary function is to
alert the opposing party of the incident upon which a claim is being
asserted. In its seminal pleading decision Conley v. Gibson,2 the
Supreme Court of the United States observed, "The Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that
the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."'
But even in this plaintiff-friendly environment, limits on otherwise
acceptable bald allegations were imposed where abuses were seen most
likely to occur. Thus, Rule 9(b) has long called for allegations of
"fraud or mistake" to be set forth with "particularity." 4 More recently,

1.
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,45 ARIz. L. REV.
987, 990 (2003). Rule 8 requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8. See also Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleadings, 2 F.R.D. 456, 462-73 (1943) (describing the then-new rules and
procedures to reach merit determinations).
2.
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
3.
Id.at 48.
4.
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). We find heightened requirements for particularity in
other areas as well, for example discrimination claims filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509
(2002). See generally Fairman, supra note 1 (reviewing various legal areas for which
there is a heightened pleading requirement).
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in Bell Atantic Corp. v. Twombly,5 the Supreme Court held that at
least in antitrust cases alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade, Conley's
permissive standard was to be replaced by a "plausible grounds"
standard whereby the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement." 6 Congress too has entered these retrenchment efforts. In
response to efforts by the "big five" accounting firms and Silicon
Valley executives, who joined forces believing they had been on the
nuisance end of a bit too much access to justice, Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) . 7 The
PSLRA has as one of its cornerstones' a heightened pleading

127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
5.
Id. at 1965. The Court justified, and perhaps thus cabined to some extent,
6.
its holding by there being significant costs flowing from discovery in antitrust cases,
particularly antitrust class actions, which may "push cost-conscious defendants to settle
even anemic cases." Id. at 1967.
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). We do not believe a
7.
compelling case has been made that the PSLRA, and particularly the heightened
pleading requirement, was a significant cause in the wide-spread reporting abuses that
caused the collapse of U.S. securities markets in 2002. Some commentators point
toward the reforms introduced by the PSLRA, and particularly the heightened pleading
requirement, as contributing to the environment that fostered the numerous financial
reporting scandals that came to light in 2001 and 2002. See, e.g., Andrd Douglas Pond
Cummings, "Ain'tNo Glory in Pain" How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United
States CapitalMarkets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 1028-29 (2005) (arguing that the PSLRA
stripped away important investor protections that facilitated abuses that ensued in the
late stages of the 1990s bull market); Daniela Nanau, Analyzing Post-Market Boom
Jurisprudencein the Second and Ninth Circuits: Has the Pendulum Really Swung Too
Farin Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 943, 946-47 (2006)
(suggesting prodefendant substantive and procedural developments contributed to
unabashed conflicts of interest, reporting violations, and manipulative practices in
public offering of securities). We believe this gives too much credit to the reforms
introduced in 1995 and too little credit to the ability of lawyers to meet the heightened
pleading requirement. On this point, it is relevant that Congress's response to the frauds
was not to repeal any provision of the PSLRA. On the contrary, Congress's response
was the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with multiple provisions
intended to strengthen the financial reporting system, not facilitate the conduct of
securities class actions.
Two other PSLRA innovations that have significantly impacted the
8.
conduct of securities class actions were enacted to reduce the likelihood of strike suits.
Adding a catch-22 feature to the heightened pleading requirement is the PSLRA's bar to
the plaintiff gaining discovery when a motion to dismiss is pending. See 109 Stat. 737,
747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006)). Thus, not only must
the plaintiff set forth with particularity facts establishing the defendant's knowledge or
recklessness in committing a misrepresentation, the plaintiff must rely on means other
than the pre-PSLRA practice of fishing through the defendant's records to gather the
required facts. It has been suggested that "constrained and targeted discovery" focused
on filling gaps in the complaint that were surfaced through the lens of the heightened
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requirement for securities class actions. Pursuant to the PSLRA,
allegations regarding the defendant's state of mind must be set forth not
only with particularity, but more significantly the facts pleaded should
give "rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind" in committing the disclosure violation.9
Several puzzles arise from the PSLRA's "strong-inference"
standard. First, just how persuasive or compelling is a strong
inference? Is this to be judged by the standard that applies in civil
litigation generally-the more-likely-than-not standard'°-or is it some
more demanding standard, such as a "high likelihood" or some
variation on that formulation? Since this determination involves testing
pleading requirement would eliminate this catch-22 problem. See Elliott J. Weiss &
Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 that the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 506-07
(1998).
The other cornerstone of the PSLRA is a mechanism by which the court selects a
lead plaintiff from competing petitioners. See § 21D(a)(3), 109 Stat. at 743 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)). Pursuant to the latter provision, after a securities
lawsuit is filed on behalf of a class, notice is given to the class inviting interested
parties to petition to be named the suit's lead plaintiff. The statute provides a rebuttable
presumption that the petitioner with the largest loss from the alleged violation is the
"most adequate" plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). Among the selected lead
plaintiff's tasks is to recommend to the court who should be counsel for the suit. By
enacting the lead plaintiff provision, Congress sought the participation of institutional
investors, believing they might reduce the frequency of misguided suits while in other
cases assuring that settlements were fair to the class members. Empirical evidence
supports Congress's belief as to the latter, as the presence of an institutional plaintiff
yields statistically significant greater returns. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Does the PlaintiffMatter? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class
Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006) [hereinafter Does the PlaintiffMatter?].
Institutional investors also appear to moderate the fees awarded to the suit's counsel
such as through presuit negotiations. See Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors:
The Impact of Competition and Experience on Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class
Actions 2 (St. John's University Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper
No.
06-0034,
2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=870577. However, not all the news regarding institutions is positive. See
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of FinancialInstitutions to
Participatein Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REv. 411, 424 (2005)
(finding that in 118 securities class-action settlements, 72 percent of institutions that
could participate in a settlement do not submit a claim once the suit is settled even
though their mean loss was almost $850,000); see also James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do InstitutionalInvestors Fail to File Claims in
Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 875-77 (2002) (revealing similar
findings in a small pilot study).
9.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat.
at 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)) (emphasis added).
10.
The Supreme Court had held that the governing standard of proof in
private securities suits is the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
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the plaintiffs' pleadings, it is a decision that of necessity is made by the
presiding judge.
There is yet another difficult question, to wit, whether in enacting
the PSLRA Congress intended to alter the prevailing standard for
evaluating motions to dismiss as set forth in Rule 12(b), namely that
any reasonable inference from the plaintiff's allegations are to be drawn
in favor of the plaintiff." But drawing inferences poses another tricky
question. If factual inferences are to be drawn both for and against the
plaintiff, does this so involve the judge in factual issues that it invades
the province of the jury 12 and violates the Seventh Amendment
guarantee of a jury trial? Not surprisingly, the PSLRA's legislative
history is bereft of insights on each of these questions. As a result, in
the ten years after the PSLRA, variations developed among the federal
circuits in their approach to the strong-inference standard so that when
the Supreme Court granted review of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.,' 3 there was optimism that clarity in this area
would be restored. As we will see in the discussion that follows,
Tellabs answers many issues surrounding the application of the stronginference standard, but leaves many significant issues unresolved.
This Paper provides two significant contributions. We first show
that Tellabs avoids deciding the hard issues that confront courts and
litigants daily in the wake of the PSLRA's heightened pleading
standard. As a consequence, the opinion keeps very much alive the
circuits' disparate interpretations of the PSLRA's fraud-pleading
standard. To be sure, Tellabs might ultimately be applied by lower
courts to narrow the range of permissible approaches that satisfy the
strong-inference standard, but leaves a good deal of room within which
wide variations in approach will continue.
Our second contribution is empirical in that we seek to answer the
question, do plaintiffs' attorneys take advantage of the differences
among the circuits' interpretations of the pleading standard to select

11.
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, defendants admit all well-pleaded
allegations and all inferences the jury can reasonably draw in the plaintiff's favor. In
this way, the motion to dismiss tests the plaintiffs best case to determine whether, as a
matter of law a claim has been stated. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974).
12.
See, e.g., Pirragliav. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003)
(professing its unwillingness to weigh inferences for fear it would "invade the
traditional role of the factfimder").
13.
127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506 (2007) ("[G]rant[ing] certiorari to resolve the
disagreement among the Circuits on whether, and to what extent, a court must consider
competing inferences in determining whether a securities fraud complaint gives rise to a
'strong inference' of scienter.").
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more favorable venues to file their cases? 4 The securities laws provide
fairly broad venue options for private litigants. Suit can be brought in
any federal district court where "the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business," and service of process is equally
broad.I" Such broad venue options invite our examination of whether
counsel in securities class actions choose a forum based on the
proximity of the forum to the defendants, or instead select a forum
opportunistically to gain a substantive advantage such as a more
favorable pleading standard.16 The forum-shopping thesis is
14.
See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Did the PrivateSecuritiesLitigationReform
Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 947-48.
15.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 27, 48 Stat. 881, 902-03
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, sec.
22(a), 48 Stat. 74, 86-87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)). The great
distinction between these two acts is that the federal courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but have concurrent
jurisdiction with the states with respect to private suits brought under the Securities Act
of 1933.
16.
In addition to the common considerations related to convenience to the
plaintiff who favors a suit near the plaintiff counsel's office, due to a number of circuit
splits, there are a host of substantive issues that can cause counsel to select a more
remote forum for the securities class action. A threshold consideration is whether the
suit is barred by the statute of limitations. The standard limitations period is that suit
must be brought within one year of discovery, and in no case longer than three years
after the violation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 extended these lengths to two years
and five years, respectively, for suits premised on fraud (as contrasted with negligent
violations). Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1658). Circuits vary not only in their interpretation of what level of
awareness constitutes "discovery," but also in whether, even after such discovery, the
statute is tolled for that period of time that upon notice of a possible violation, the
investor through reasonable diligence would have discovered the facts underlying the
fraud. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS
798-99 (5th ed. 2006) (collecting cases illustrating different approaches).
An important consideration in securities class actions is finding a culpable
defendant with sufficient resources to make the suit worth prosecuting. Following the
Supreme Court's rejection of aiding-and-abetting liability in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), implicating such
a person has become not only challenging, but also invites forum shopping. To be so
liable, the defendant must either be a primary participant or a control person. Circuits
vary in their approach to defining who is a primary violator.To illustrate, consider the
so-called bright-line test followed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. In a leading case, the court held that an accounting firm that falsely assured
management that its 1995 results were accurate was not liable to investors who relied
on reports released by management. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169,
175-76 (2d Cir. 1998). Reasoning that investor reliance upon a false statement made by
the defendant is an essential aspect for liability, the court concluded that, since the
accountants were not identified in the reports, the reports could not thereby be
connected to the accountants such that the investors could be deemed to have relied on
any representation attributable to the accountants. Just the opposite result would occur
had the suit been maintained in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
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straightforward. Litigants, and their attorneys, want to maximize their
overall recoveries in securities fraud class actions. If they have a

portfolio of cases that they are considering filing over a broad range of
different venues (which the securities laws' liberal venue provisions
permit them to do) ,17 they are more likely to file their highest-value
cases in jurisdictions where they perceive the odds of winning are the
best. Since nearly all securities class actions that survive motions to
dismiss are settled, economically rational plaintiffs' lawyers will deduce
that the applicable pleading standard by which the case must pass to
reach a settlement should impact their choice of where to file it. That
is, if court A can be expected to apply a more stringent threshold for
Circuit, which adheres to the more liberal "substantial participant" standard whereby
liability attaches to accountants who knowingly draft, edit or review reports they know
are false and will be released to the public. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1994). Divisions among the circuits also
exist with respect to defining a control person. Both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act impose liability on those who directly or indirectly control a primary
violator. In addition to reaching the firm's controlling stockholder, this provision also
extends liability to senior managers, audit committee chairmen, and in some cases
outside directors. However, a distinct minority of the circuits follow the lead of the
Second Circuit in holding that control-person liability extends only to control persons
who were "culpable participants" in the primary violator's misbehavior. See, e.g.,
Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998) (determining that a control
person must in "some meaningful sense" act culpably (quoting SEC v. First Jersey
Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996))); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff must prove that a control
person's action or inaction "'was deliberate and done intentionally to further the fraud'"
(quoting Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975))). Most
circuits are like the Ninth Circuit and do not premise control-person liability on a
showing of complicity by the control person. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); see also Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1992); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630 (8th
Cir. 1985); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981); G.A. Thompson &
Co., Inc. v. Partridge,636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1981).
Even questions of proving the materiality of a misrepresentation elicit differences
between the circuits. For example, the Ninth Circuit does not require an observable
change in a firm's security price to support an allegation that the representation was
materially misleading. See No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust
Fund v. Am, W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that other
events in the market may muffle or distort prices on the day the allegedly false report
was released). In contrast, the United States Court of Appeal for the Third and Fourth
Circuits require this type of evidence. Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474,
479 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Burlington CoatFactorySec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir.
1997). In sum, there are numerous circuit splits that prevent the federal securities
remedies available to investors from being uniform so that class counsel can be
expected to take into account these considerations in determining where to file suit.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 27, 48 Stat. 881, 90217.
03 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa) (providing that suit can be brought in any
federal district court "wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business").
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pleadings than court B, then all other things being equal, the plaintiffs'
counsel will choose to file cases in court B where they have the greater
likelihood of survival. Stringent pleading standards might thus be an
important factor in plaintiffs' counsels' choice of forum.
An alternative hypothesis is that defendants are not without
recourse should the selected forum place them at a substantive
disadvantage or visit serious practical inconvenience to them. The wellestablished doctrine of forum non conveniens, now subsumed in the
statutory change of venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1404,8 is available
to defendants who believe the plaintiff's initial choice of forum poses
substantial burdens on them. Moreover, when multiple complaints are
filed, as is frequently the case, and one plaintiffs' attorney selects an
inconvenient forum for the corporation while a second plaintiffs'
attorney files in the corporation's home district, the multi-districtlitigation (MDL) panel can address opportunism via its authority to
transfer the two cases to "any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings. " 9 While consolidated cases are supposed to be
returned to their home jurisdiction after they finish pretrial motions and
discovery, securities fraud cases rarely go to trial so they are effectively
decided in the court where they are referred by the MDL system. Our
conversations with several well-known plaintiffs' counsels consistently
reflected their view that it is impractical for them to engage in forum
shopping due to the strong likelihood that their choice of a venue that is
18.
Section 1404 is a statutory recognition of the common-law doctrine and
provides "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Of interest in the class-action context is
that convenience to the class representative carries less weight than in nonrepresentative
suits. See, e.g., In re Nematron Corp. Sec. Litig., 30 F. Supp. 2d 397, 400, 405-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (giving a securities class action's lead plaintiffs choice of forum little
a weight in decision to relocate suit to another state).
19.
28 U.S.C. § 1407. Pursuant to section 1407, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation can temporarily transfer two or more civil actions "involving
one or more common questions of fact" to a single "district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings." Id. If the defendant moves for the transfer to the
MDL panel, the defendant has the burden of persuasion that the transfer meets the
criteria of section 1407. See In re Advantage Investors Mortgage Corp. Mortgage Fund
Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2003). An earlier study found that most
transferred actions are terminated in the transferee court by some form of pretrial
disposition. See Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to MultidistrictLitigation, 124 F.R.D.
479, 480 (1989) (reporting that only about 18 percent of the cases were ultimately
remanded to their original court). While there is some uncertainty whether section 1407
permits the transferee court to rule on forum-non-conveniens issues, the transferee
courts do, from time to time, grant motions pursuant to section 1404. See, e.g., In re
Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 C 1129, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11147, at
*24-25 (D. Ill. June 17, 1999) (granting a section 1404(a) motion to transfer seven
securities class actions after they were consolidated for pretrial proceedings).
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removed from the defendant firm's principal place of business will be
immediately followed by a successful (not to mention expensive and
time consuming) defendant's motion to relocate the suit. Hence, rather
than engage in a futile act, they file suit initially in the defendant
company's home district.
Our empirical analysis examines a large number of settlements in
securities class actions, dividing the settlements into discrete groups
according to the applicable approach to satisfying the strong-inference
requirement that was followed in the circuit in which the settled case
was litigated. We examine whether settled cases are filed in forums that
are geographically remote to the defendant company's principal place
of business. We find that 85 percent of the securities fraud class actions
in our sample are filed in the home circuit of the defendant corporation.
In the remainder of cases, those that are filed outside the defendant's
home jurisdiction, our analysis shows that differences in the pleading
standards do not explain a statistically significant amount of the reason
for that decision.
While the differences in the circuits' pleading standards do not
have a statistically significant impact on the plaintiffs' choice of venue,
we find that plaintiffs are more likely to file low-value cases in
jurisdictions other than the one in which the defendant's headquarters is
located. Further, we find that cases with smaller provable losses and
without an accompanying Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
investigation are statistically significantly more likely to be filed in
circuits other than where the defendant's principal place of business is
located. We interpret the former result as consistent with the hypothesis
that in lower-value cases, plaintiffs' counsel is more likely to select
jurisdictions that are convenient to themselves rather than to the
defendant. It may also reflect defendants' reluctance to engage in costly
forum selection motions in cases where it is cheaper to settle the case.
Conversely, when an SEC investigation is proceeding on the basis of
the same operative facts, our results are consistent with the claim that
plaintiffs' counsel will avoid filing outside of the defendant
corporation's home jurisdiction to avoid procedural delays. Overall, we
conclude that our findings support the view that the federal circuits'
differing approaches to interpreting the PSLRA's pleading standard do
not contribute to forum shopping by plaintiffs' counsel.
These results provide important background information for
evaluating the social-welfare implications of Tellabs. Our data is
consistent with the view that Tellabs should be evaluated largely on the
technical basis of whether it leads to a more uniform interpretation of
the federal securities laws. We argue that Tellabs should be viewed as
gently nudging the judicial system in the direction of a more uniform
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interpretation of the federal securities laws, while at the same time not
announcing a single standard, let alone a clarion one.

The organization of our analysis is straightforward. In Part I, we
provide a close examination of Tellabs as well as the quilt of case law
that the PSLRA spawned with respect to the federal courts' approaches
to applying the strong-inference pleading requirement. In Part II we
examine filing, dismissal, and settlement patterns for federal securities
class actions. We next turn, in Part III, to determining whether

plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases engage in any forum shopping, and if
so, whether the more stringent pleading standards applied by some
circuits appear to affect plaintiffs' decisions about where to file these
cases. The full implications of our findings on Tellabs and the future
conduct of securities litigation are set forth in the concluding section.
I. THE PLEADING MtLANGE

Even before the PSLRA, circuits varied in their approaches to
applying Rule 9(b)'s requirements that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake,
a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake," and that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." 2 For
example, prior to the PSLRA, Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement
enjoyed at best a drive-by quality in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit since its approach required only that the plaintiff
set forth a description of the facts or circumstances alleged to constitute
fraud, coupled with a conclusory statement that the facts and
circumstances were fraudulent. 2 This essentially permitted complaints
in the Ninth Circuit to survive motions to dismiss without setting forth
any particular facts regarding the defendant's state of mind. In contrast,
20.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The 1937 advisory committee notes on Rule 9(b) are
limited to: "See English Rules Under the JudicatureAct (The Annual Practice, 1937)
0. 19, r.22." See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 app. 02
(3d ed. 2008). The text of Rule 9(b) has remained unchanged by subsequent
amendments. See Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers-Strike
Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 281, 286-87 (2004) (finding the history of Rule 9(b)
to be scant and quoting the English Rules Under the Judicature Act: "'Wherever it is
material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the
mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out
the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred .... Fraud must be distinctly
alleged and proved. The acts alleged to be fraudulent must be stated otherwise no
evidence in support of them will be received,'" and quoting the architect of the Rules,
Judge Clark's explanation for Rule 9(b): "'While useful, this rule probably states only
what courts would do anyhow and may not be considered absolutely essential.'")
21.
See, e.g., Inre GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546-49 (9th
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit maintained
the most demanding approach under Rule 9(b), requiring that not only
could fraud not be alleged via conclusory allegations, but that the
complaint's specific allegations of fraud must create a "'strong
inference' of fraudulent intent. ,22 This interpretation was later refined
when the Second Circuit embraced two broad alternative means by
which a complaint could plead a strong inference of scienter; the
complaint could either plead facts alleging a "motive and opportunity"
on the part of the defendant to commit a misrepresentation, or plead
"facts that constitute strong23 circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness."
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress opted for the Second Circuit's
strong-inference standard, believing this was necessary to curb the
frequency of baseless securities class actions that were being filed to
extort recoveries as a consequence of lax procedural protections of
defendants. However, the PSLRA's legislative history was at best
equivocal as to whether Congress intended to adopt the Second
Circuit's judicial approach, namely motive and opportunity, inapplying
the new pleading standard, or instead believed that the strong-inference
standard should be applied with even greater rigor than it had been
applied by the Second Circuit. For example, on the one hand, the
Senate Banking Committee's report accompanying the PSLRA states
"courts may find ... [the Second Circuit] law instructive" in
24
construing the new pleading requirement. On the other hand, the
Conference Committee Report appears to reject the Second Circuit's
interpretation by observing, "Because the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend
to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard." 25 The report proceeds, "For this reason, the Conference
Report chose not to include in the pleading standard 26certain language
President Bill
relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness.",
that Congress
concern
his
to
Clinton's veto of the bill was in response
the Second
than
intended the pleading standard to be more rigorous
2 7 In the debate leading up to the successful override
Circuit's approach.

22. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litg., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting O'Brien v. Nat7 Prop. Analysts Partners,936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Shields v.Cioytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128-30 (2d Cir. 1994).
23.
24. S.REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995).
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf.Rep.).
25.
Id. at 41 n.23.
26.
27. See 141 CONG. REc. H15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (showing that
President Clinton expressed his desire for a high pleading standard and found the
balance struck inthe Second Circuit optimal, but believed that the standard embraced in
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of the president's veto, the Senate managers professed their admiration
for the Second Circuit's standard; 21 their new found affinity for the
Second Circuit's standard may well have reflected the political
necessity for moderation, since the Senate ultimately overrode the veto
with only a two-vote margin.29 What emerged in the ensuing decade
from this politically expedient ambiguity were three distinct approaches
to interpreting the strong-inference standard: the Ninth Circuit
standard, the Second Circuit standard, and an intermediate standard.
Reflecting a complete reversal from its pre-PSLRA position, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the most demanding standard by which the
securities class-action complaint must set forth facts creating a strong
inference of fraud. After its 1999 decision in n re Silicon GraphicsInc.
Securities Litigation,3 ° the court determined the plaintiff needed to
plead facts that created a strong inference that the defendant knew the
statements were false, or that the defendant was consciously or
deliberately reckless in disregarding the truth or falsity of the
statements.31 No other circuit has joined the Ninth Circuit in this
the PSLRA would "raise the standard even beyond that level" with the consequence
that meritorious cases would not be heard).
28.
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S19150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Domenici) (stating that the PSLRA's pleading standard "is the Second Circuit's
pleading standard"); 141 CONG. REc. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dodd) (asserting that the PSLRA met the Second Circuit's standard and that courts
could be expected to look to the Second Circuit opinions for guidance in interpreting
the PSLRA's pleading standard); see also 141 CONG. REC. H15219 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (stating that the Second Circuit's standard was
embodied in the PSLRA). These professions are at odds with the earlier adoption by the
Senate of an amendment sponsored by Senator Specter expressly incorporating the
Second Circuit's criteria into the PSLRA. See 141 CONG. REC. S9222 (daily ed. June
28, 1995). This provision was, however, removed in the ensuing conference between
the differing House and Senate versions. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 1-30 (showing
that the bill emerging from the Conference Committee did not include the provision
sponsored by Senator Specter). In place of the Specter amendment was the Conference
Committee's statement that "[blecause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen
existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case
law interpreting this pleading standard." Id. at 41. For a close review of the PSLRA's
legislative history, see Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 193,
243-44 (1998) (concluding that Congress did not intend to address whether recklessness
could give rise to liability, but rather wished to address only the pleading issue).
29.
Professors Grundfest and Pritchard cogently develop the view that not just
the Congress but the courts benefit from ambiguity, finding something of a symbiotic
relationship each has in adhering to the necessity of ambiguity of outcome as often the
necessity for reaching legislative consensus. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C.
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in
StatutoryDesign andInterpretation,54 STAN. L. REv. 627, 649 (2002).
30.
183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
31.
See, e.g., id. at 974.
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approach, and, as we shall see, the Ninth Circuit itself appears to be
backing away from this standard after the Tellabs decision.
The Second Circuit, believing its earlier position had been codified
32
by the PSLRA, continues to follow its prior approach, joined by the
34
33
United States Court of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits.

Most circuits position themselves between the Ninth and Second Circuit
positions, hence embracing an intermediate standard, embracing what
35
can be understood as a motive-and-opportunity-plus approach. Under
this intermediate standard, motive and opportunity alone do not
necessarily suffice to establish a strong inference of fraudulent
behavior; they customarily require factual allegations that bear on
matters other than motive and opportunity for a complaint to withstand
a motion to dismiss.
There were several reasons for expecting that the PSLRA's
pleading standard would find its way to the Supreme Court. For one, a
split among circuits on an important legal issue always makes a grant of
certiorari more likely. But even more compelling to some justices may
have been the oft-stated view that the PSLRA's fundamental objective
of curbing the frequency of securities class actions had been impeded
36
by the lower courts' misapplication of the pleading standard. Indeed, a
See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir.
32.
1999) (citing support from case law adopted before the passage of the PSLRA).
See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir.
33.
1999).
See Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645,
34.
659-61 (8th Cir. 2001).
See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th
35.
Cir. 2006); Ottman v. HangerOrthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344-45 (4th Cir.
2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406-11 (5th Cir. 2001); City of
Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1249, 1259, 1261-62 (10th Cir.
2001); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 188, 194-95, 198-200 (1st Cir.
1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999); Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283, 1287 (llth Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., Perino, supra note 14, at 915-16, 929, 942-47 (reviewing 1499
36.
securities class actions filed between 1996 and 2001 and concluding that the Second
Circuit and intermediate standards contributed to there being as many, or even more,
filings after the PSLRA's enactment than were filed before). This is not to say that the
pleading standard has not had its impact. The rate of dismissals of securities fraud cases
has nearly doubled since the passage of the PSLRA. Compare RONALD |. MILLER ET
AL., NERA EcON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: BEYOND THE MEGA-SETTLEMENTS, IS STABILIZATION AHEAD? 4 (Apr.
available at http://www.nera.com/image/brorecenttrends2006_sec979_
2006),
ppb-final.pdf (reporting a dismissal rate of 40.3 percent for securities class actions filed
from 1998 to 2003), with ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., NERA EcON. CONSULTING,
RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: ARE WORLDCOM AND
ENRON THE NEW STANDARD? 3 (July 2005) (finding a dismissal rate of 20.3 percent for

securities class actions filed from 1991 to 1995).

HeinOnline -- 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 433 2009

434

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

high-level theoretical debate continues to rage over whether one of the
contributing forces to the feared lack of competitiveness of U.S. capital
markets is the serious risk of securities class actions faced by public
companies.37 The Supreme Court's disposition of Tellabs was therefore
anticipated, and eagerly so, in many quarters.
Tellabs was litigated under the intermediate standard adopted by
the Seventh Circuit. The complaint focused on a series of misstatements
committed by the CEO of Tellabs, Inc., Richard C. Notebaert. The
misstatements ran the gamut from claims of high consumer demand for
its flagship product, assertions of growing demand for a new product
that was represented to be available, and statements of present and
prospective revenue. 3 ' None of the statements were correct so that
when, in early spring 2001, Tellabs announced that consumer demand
had diminished and that revenues would not be as forecast, its shares
dropped from $67.125 to $15.87. The district court twice dismissed the
plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the complaint failed to meet the
strong-inference pleading requirement with respect to Notebaert's state
of mind. The district court believed that the plaintiffs' allegations that
Notebaert attended numerous meetings and participated in phone calls
concerning the status of Tellabs's products did not establish scienter
since no details of the meetings or calls were alleged. 9

37.

See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION,

COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION

INTERIM REPORT OF THE

11-15, 18 (Nov. 30, 2006), available

at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (calling
for a variety of substantive reforms in the antifraud rule to provide greater clarity and
fewer private suits, including the introduction of alternative-dispute mechanisms such as
arbitration). One need look no further than a recent Supreme Court decision to find
similar expressions of the harm securities litigation does to U.S. global
competitiveness. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners,LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761, 766, 773-74 (2008) (rejecting a scheme-liability approach to reach third-party
vendors who knowingly participate in a plan to inflate their vendee's revenues).
38.
Specifically, the plaintiffs set forth four principal misstatements. First, the
plaintiffs stated that demand for the company's existing flagship product, the TITAN
5500, was continuing to grow, when in fact it was declining. Second, they stated that
the new-generation TITAN 6500 was available for delivery and was experiencing
strong demand; in fact, the product was not available and demand was weak. Third,
Notebaert's representations regarding fourth-quarter performance were misleading by
failing to disclose they entailed "channel stuffing" practices whereby product shipments
did not represent true sales of the quarter. Fourth, Notebaert overstated revenue
projections by failing to reflect in his estimates the weakening demand for the TITAN
5500 and the delays in introducing the TITAN 6500.
39.
Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(finding that plaintiffs' allegations that Notebaert attended a late April meeting in which
he explained that Tellabs's SALIX technology was outdated failed to even support an
inference of negligence or recklessness because it was consistent with an early-April
public disclosure announcing the termination of the SALIX product line).
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The Seventh Circuit reversed,' stating that the strong-inference
standard called on the court to review all the inferences that could be
drawn from the complaint and to deny a motion to dismiss "if it alleges
facts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the
41
defendant acted with the required intent." The panel reasoned, in
part, that in light of the flagship product's significance to Tellabs and
the number of internal reports that the product was experiencing
problems, it could be reasonably inferred that Notebaert knew his
optimistic statements were false.42 The court reached similar
conclusions with the false representations of availability and demand for
the next-generation product.43 As for the false representation of
revenues, the panel believed sufficient facts had been alleged to
establish that Notebaert was aware that the firm engaged in "channel
stuffing" to inflate revenues." Finally, Notebaert's scienter with respect
to revenue projections was also believed to have been sufficiently pled

since future performance was dependent upon success of the flagship

and next-generation products, and facts circumstantially suggested he
45
knew these facts were contrary to his optimistic projections.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Seventh Circuit had
applied too low a standard. It reasoned that a strong inference required
46
the strength of the inference to be "powerful or cogent," and not
47
merely "reasonable" or "permissible." The Court elaborated that "a

Makor, 437 F.3d at 605.
40.
Id. at 602 (asserting that when a court is "'[flaced with two seemingly
41.
equally strong inferences, one favoring the plaintiff and one favoring the defendant, it
is inappropriate for [a judge] to make a determination as to which inference will
ultimately prevail"' because that would "'invade the traditional role of the factfmder.'"
(quoting Pirragliav. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003))).
Id. at 603 (finding that internal reports in March 2001 indicated the
42.
market for the TITAN 5500 was drying up, "[y]et in April 2001, Notebaert told
financial analysts that 'everything we hear from the customers indicates that our in-user
demand for services continues to grow."').
Id. at 604-05 (finding that plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts to support a
43.
strong inference that Notebaert knowingly lied when he informed investors that the
TITAN 6500 was available and being shipped, when in fact the product was not ready
for deployment).
Id. (relying on the plaintiffs' evidence suggesting that Notebaert knew
44.
about the channel stuffing and even allegedly "'worked directly with Tellabs's sales
personnel' to effect the channel stuffing" and determining that the plaintiffs' "complaint
contain[ed] enough detail to establish a strong inference that Notebaert knew of the
channel stuffing and therefore knew Tellabs had exaggerated its fourth quarter 2000
revenues.").
Id. at 605.
45.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rghts, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2502,
46.
2510 (2007).
Id.
47.
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court must consider plausible nonculpable explanations for the
defendant's conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff" a' so
that the allegations of scienter "must be cogent and compelling, thus
strong in light of other explanations." 4 9 To be noted here is that it is not
enough that the facts more likely than not support an inference of
scienter; what the court also requires is that the inference meet a
standard of persuasion, which the Court stated required an inference of
scienter that was "cogent and compelling," not just "reasonable and
permissible." 50 Whether the complaint meets this requirement is to be
determined based on the totality of the allegations. 5 While
acknowledging that the defendant's motive, such as personal gain, is a
relevant consideration, the particular significance of motive in
supporting an allegation of scienter "depends on the entirety of the
complaint." 52 Most importantly, the Court disagreed with the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that this evaluation by the presiding judge would
violate the plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury trial."
The Court held that the PSLRA did not change the procedures for
treating motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) whereby the
plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true.54 Thus, the evaluation
engaged in by the judge is merely to assure that the plaintiff has met the
conditions for properly lodging a complaint with the court, a matter it
believed was within Congress's constitutional authority, and not a
disposition on the merits for which there is a constitutional right to a
jury trial.55
It is difficult to fully assess Tellabs's likely impact on the future
conduct of securities litigation.5 6 One inescapable conclusion is that a
bare allegation of motive and opportunity will not meet Tellabs's call
for a cogent and compelling inference, potentially casting doubt on the
48.
Id. at 2502.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 2502, 2510. On this point, consider the Court's statement: "When
the allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person
deem the inference of scienter at least as strongas any opposing inference?" Id.at 2511
(emphasis added). Note the Court's earlier construction of strong.
51.
Id.at 2509, 2511.
52.
Id. at 2511.
53.
Id. at 2511-12.
54.
Id. at 2502, 2504, 2512-13.
55.
Id. at 2512-13.
56.
On remand, Judge Posner reversed the order of considering "cogent" and
"compelling," reasoning that the latter being a quantitative standard should be
considered first as in many instances (particularly when there are but two possible
inferences, the one favoring the plaintiffs' version of the facts being more persuasive),
that which is compelling will be also cogent. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705, 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008).
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continued viability of the Second Circuit standard. But a close review
of Second Circuit decisions reveals that motive and opportunity were
far from an automatic talisman for meeting the strong-inference
standard. 7 Thus, if this were to be Tellabs's contribution, it would
have minimal effect. We believe Tellabs's salience within securities
litigation will come from its call for courts to focus on all aspects of the
complaint, its requirement that inferences are to be drawn both for and
against the plaintiff, and its enunciation of a somewhat malleable
meaning for strong. In the end, the impact of each of these innovations
depends heavily on not just the facts of the individual case but equally
so on the particular perspective of the presiding judge.
Moreover, Tellabs's call to examine the entire pleadings before
the court appears at this time to impact the somewhat narrower,
categorical considerations of factors that preceded Tellabs. This
conclusion is no clearer than its impact on the Ninth Circuit, where in
5" the Ninth Circuit correctly
South Ferry L.P., #2 v. Killinger,
interpreted Tellabs's call for considering all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the facts to permit general allegations related to the overall
operations of the defendant firm to satisfy pleading scienter on the part
of the firm's officers.59 Indeed, Killinger reverses the Ninth Circuit's
earlier Silicon Graphics decision's approach of not considering
allegations that were viewed as either vague or ambiguous, relying on
Tellabs' s call that the pleadings be considered in their totality. 6°

See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir. 2000)
57.
(asserting that with respect to motive, "[g]eneral allegations that the defendants acted in
their economic self-interest are not enough"); Fishbaum v. Liz Claiborne,Inc., No. 989396, 1999 WL 568023, at *4 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[N]o inference of scienter should be
drawn from insider trading activity unless that activity is unusual."); Chill v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the alleged motive must entail
concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the alleged false statements
or wrongful nondisclosures, and additionally that "[t]he motive to maintain the
appearance of corporate profitability, or of the success of an investment, will naturally
involve benefit to a corporation, but does not 'entail concrete benefits'" (quoting
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994))).
542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
58.
Id. at 783-84.
59.
Id. at 784. According to Illinger:
60.
[Aillegations regarding management's role in a company may be relevant
and help to satisfy the PSLRA scienter requirement in three circumstances.
First, the allegations may be used in any form along with other allegations
that, when read together, raise an inference of scienter ....

Second, such

allegations may independently satisfy the PSLRA where they are particular
and suggest that defendants had actual access to the disputed information
.
Finally, such allegations may conceivably satisfy the PSLRA standard
in a more bare form, without accompanying particularized allegations, in
rare circumstances where the nature of the relevant fact is of such
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While the question of whether it is appropriate to draw inferences
against, not just for, the plaintiff is new to the case law,6 we suspect
that the rather recent development of this idea by courts was merely
bringing to the foreground what had been occurring all along; judges
considering motions to dismiss regularly evaluated sub silentio the

permissible inferences against the inferences the plaintiff proposed,
drawing from the pled facts. 62 Thus, we are not at all persuaded that,
post-Tellabs, all three of the earlier purportedly different approaches
will not persist. Indeed, since Tellabs deftly avoided choosing from
among the three competing approaches, clothing the standard with
malleable expressions such as cogency and compelling while inviting
consideration of all factual allegations and asking for inferences to be
drawn both for and against the plaintiff, the opinion does not provide a
clear method for choosing among the m6lange of tests currently
employed by the different circuits.
The implication of this is it is even more important today to
empirically assess whether securities class-action litigation involves

opportunistic forum shopping. We therefore turn next to this important
issue.

prominence that it would be "absurd" to suggest that management was
without knowledge of the matter.
Id. at 785-86.
61.
Lower courts divided on this issue along the same lines as they did on the
role that motive and opportunity should play. Thus, courts falling into the intermediatestandard position held that the approach to competing inferences is to select the "most
plausible" of the competing inferences. See In re Credt Suisse FirstBoston Corp., 431
F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005); Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a strong inference of scienter exists when the guilty inference is more
credible than an innocent inference); Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353
F.3d 338, 350 (4th Cir. 2003). This language also is similar to the approach taken in
the Ninth Circuit pursuant to its most demanding pleading standard. See Gompper v.
VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2002). Somewhat related to this mostplausible-inference standard is the more generalized guidance that the strength of the
inference is to be determined from the "overall context" of the facts alleged. See
Pirragliav. Novel, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003); In re K-tel Int'l, Inc.
Sec. Litg., 300 F.3d 881, 889 n.6 (8th Cir. 2002). These various approaches appear to
involve insignificant differences among them, and each appears consistent with the
general statements announced by the Supreme Court in Tellabs. The Seventh Circuit
adopted none of these approaches in its decision and substituted a weaker test of
whether "a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required
intent." Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir.
2006).
62.
See, e.g., In re Credit Suisse FirstBoston Corp., 431 F.3d at 51 (finding
that Rule 12(b)(6) "does not require the court, in a PSLRA case, to turn a blind eye to
the universe of possible conclusions stemming from a given fact or set of facts");
Pirraglia,339 F.3d at 1187 ("Whether an inference is a strong one cannot be decided in
a vacuum.").
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II. Do PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS ENGAGE IN FORUM SHOPPING?

Tellabs leaves us in a world where different circuits will apply
different standards to resolve federal securities law cases. Given these
differences, economically rational plaintiffs' attorneys might try to
maximize the value of the cases they file by selecting the most
favorable jurisdiction for their cases. Given the liberal venue provisions
of the federal securities laws, plaintiffs' counsel has essentially
unlimited choices of where to file, subject to the previously described
governors of the forum-non-conveniens doctrine and the consolidation
authority of the MDL panel.
Prior scholarship has hypothesized that a plaintiffs' attorney has a
portfolio of cases that he or she will file in one of a number of
jurisdictions across the country, taking advantage of the liberal venue
provisions of the federal securities laws.63 If true, there would be
several important considerations that bear on this filing decision:
location of the defendant company, location of the law firm, location of
witnesses and documents, and perhaps most importantly, the attorney's
perception of how receptive a court is to securities fraud cases. 4 The
pleading standard of fraud employed by a particular court undoubtedly
bears heavily in weighing this final factor. In simple economic terms, if
the attorney can select any venue, then she will choose, on an ex ante
basis, the jurisdiction where the expected value of the suit is highest.
Stricter pleading standards should increase the likelihood of dismissal of
the case, all other things being equal, so that plaintiffs should seek to
file in jurisdictions with the weakest fraud-pleading standards. The key
to settlement is to survive a motion to dismiss and the odds of doing so
may be much better in some circuits than in others.

See Perino, supra note 14, at 947-48. One commentator on this Paper
63.
suggested that it would be interesting to examine the decision to file suit in the first
place. While on a theoretical basis we agree that this would add some interesting
insights, as a practical matter we have no way of counting the number of suits that were
not filed.
We are not writing on a blank slate. The president who appointed the
64.
judge to the court and the frequency of securities class actions in that jurisdiction are
among the variables Professors Grundfest and Pritchard found in the courts' choice of
pleading standard. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 29, at 635. Professors
Pritchard and Sale find that the nature of the misrepresentation, for example, a forward
looking statement, is correlated with the likely success of a motion to dismiss. See A. C.

Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud?An EmpiricalStudy ofMotions to
Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 125, 146 (2005) (analyzing cases from the Second and Ninth Circuits to

conclude that allegations of accounting violations are more likely to survive the
pleading requirements in the former than the latter).
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However, this thesis neglects a very important institutional feature
of the federal judicial system: the MDL panel and change-of-venue
provisions in section 1404. As we discussed in Part I, if multiple class
actions are filed in different jurisdictions all alleging securities fraud
arising out of the same set of operative facts, the MDL panel will
determine which court will handle all of these cases. This process will
result in significant delays and costs for plaintiffs' counsel, and most
likely lead to all of the cases being consolidated in the defendant
corporation's home jurisdiction. Similarly, if only one suit is filed, but
it is filed outside of the defendant's home circuit, the defendant will
likely file a motion for change of venue on the grounds that it will be
most efficient to litigate the case where all of the main witnesses, the
defendant's officers, and most of the documents are located.
This leads us to our alternative hypothesis: that plaintiffs file in the
defendant corporation's home circuit in order to avoid having their
cases transferred into the MDL-panel system or having to face the
company's motion for a change of venue. If this is correct, then we
should see that a high percentage of cases are filed in the corporation's
home circuit, and that the differences in pleading standards have little
effect on the choice of where to file. However, the general tendency
may be offset in some cases by other considerations, such as the
convenience of the plaintiffs' counsel, or the cost-benefit ratio for the
plaintiffs' law firm in litigating a low-value case far from their own
home.

We begin by trying to provide some empirical background on the
scope of the differences between circuits so as to provide a general
overview of where securities fraud class actions are filed, how the
different circuits generally treat motions to dismiss, and the likelihood
of settlement of the case if it survives a motion to dismiss. Table 1
provides a general overview of the filing, dismissal, and settlement of
securities fraud class actions for all circuits. We constructed this table
using data from the RiskMetrics (formerly Institutional Shareholder
Services) database on securities fraud class-action settlements. 65 We
note that the data for 1993 are incomplete as many cases were not
entered into the RiskMetrics database at that time

65.
We would like to thank RiskMetrics for providing us with access to this
database. We would also like to thank NERA Economic Consulting for providing
similar data on class-action filings from their database of securities fraud class-action
settlements. We choose to use the RiskMetrics data in this Paper because we had more
complete access to its data. We note, however, that the NERA data on case filings,
while not identical to the RiskMetrics data, are quite similar.
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Table 1: Securities Fraud Class Actions Filed, Settled or Dismissed 1993-2006
Panel A: Number of Cases Filed
Total

Year

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

10th

l1th

1993

2

16

5

1

2

0

3

3

18

1

4

55

13

7

12

63

6

13

218

1994

15

50

18

9

12

1995

10

34

14

3

16

14

7

3

72

8

15

196

1996

11

14

14

4

7

3

2

2

31

5

14

107

1997

8

34

12

2

7

7

9

8

56

3

24

170

1998

14

51

23

8

25

12

6

5

59

7

25

235

1999

12

32

18

11

25

10

11

10

54

11

24

218

2000

17

39

21

15

13

10

13

6

51

7

22

214

2001

12

31

19

8

7

9

10

7

61

9

16

189

2002

14

81

22

6

17

15

15

17

44

5

21

257

2003

18

58

19

11

18

14

11

8

43

8

21

229

22

250

2004

10

56

23

21

17

7

12

9

68

5

2005

9

46

17

7

13

12

9

12

35

7

9

176

2006

8

35

13

5

8

6

4

6

29

3

14

131

160

577

238

111

187

132

119

108

684

85

244

2645

9th

10th

11th

Total

Total

Panel B: Number of Cases Settled
4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

4

1

2

0

1

3

18

1

4

50

16

4

7

8

7

9

48

6

10

161

13

3

10

13

3

3

55

8

11

153

8

12

1

6

1

2

1

19

3

8

69

24

6

1

5

6

8

6

38

1

14

117

18

3

15

12

4

3

35

4

12

145

1st

2nd

1993

2

14

1994

11

35

1995

9

25

1996

8

1997

8

1998

6

33

Year

3rd

1999

9

15

11

6

13

5

5

4

26

11

17

122

2000

9

22

13

9

7

6

10

1

30

7

12

126

2001

8

19

13

2

2

2

8

6

38

8

10

116

2002

7

45

9

1

9

10

7

9

22

3

9

131

2003

5

16

9

3

8

7

2

4

17

4

12

87

2004

6

15

4

4

5

1

4

4

24

3

9

79

2005

3

10

4

1

3

1

2

3

6

3

2

38

2006

2

1

1

0

2

0

0

0

1

0

0

7

Total

93

282

133

39

94

72

63

56

377

62

130

1401
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Panel C: Number of Cases Dismissed
Year

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

10th

1 th

Total

1993
1994

0
4

2
12

1
2

0
5

0
5

0
4

2
0

0
3

5
51

1
3
0
8
3

8
5
10
10
14

1
2
6
5
5

0
3
1
5
5

6
1
2
9
11

1
2
0
0
5

4
0
1
2
6

0
1
2
2
6

0
0
0
2
1
3
0

0
3

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

0
13
15
12
16
23
27

3
6
10
13
6

39
37
49
80
88

2000

5

14

8

6

6

4

2

2

17

0

10

74

2001

3

5

3

6

2

4

1

1

18

1

3

47

2002

6

19

7

4

4

4

4

6

12

1

9

76

2003

8

18

1

5

7

2

4

4

15

1

5

70

2004

1

15

6

3

5

6

3

2

25

1

6

73

2005

3

12

3

2

8

3

3

6

20

1

2

57

2006

0

2

2

1

0

1

1

2

1

0

3

13

Total

45

146

52

46

60

36

33

37

214

11

79

759

The most salient feature of these data is the large number of cases
filed, dismissed, and settled in the Ninth and Second Circuits. These
two jurisdictions are disproportionately important, with more than half
of all securities fraud class actions being filed in them collectively.
Table 1 reveals that the dismissal rate for cases filed in the Ninth
Circuit in 1995, prior to the PSLRA, was 20.8 percent, it climbed to
34.9 percent by 2003, and in 2005, it stood at 57.1 percent. This
suggests that the pleading standard matters, and likely a lot. The
dismissal rate in the Second Circuit prior to the PSLRA (when it
applied a more rigorous interpretation of the "particularity"
requirement than the Ninth Circuit) was 23.5 percent, followed by 31
percent for cases filed in 2003, and in 2005, it was 26 percent. Thus,
these back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that dismissal rates in
the Ninth Circuit are significantly higher, by more than a factor of two,
than in the Second Circuit. All things being equal, the plaintiffs'
counsel should look more warmly on filing in the Second Circuit than
the Ninth Circuit. But as our data reflect, there are serious institutional
forces that retard such opportunistic behavior.
Table 2 illustrates the division of all of the cases in our sample into
the five categories mentioned above. The first three groups contain the
cases in our sample that were filed (and later settled) in courts under
the three pleading standards for fraud: the Silicon Graphic standard, the
intermediate standard, or the Second Circuit standard. We have
approximately one hundred cases in the latter two categories and
slightly fewer in our sample from the Ninth Circuit after it decided the

HeinOnline -- 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 442 2009

2009:421

Differences in PleadingStandards

Silicon Graphics case. The remaining cases in our sample consist of
269 cases that were filed (and settled) after the passage of the PSLRA
at the end of 1995, and 139 cases that were filed prior to the enactment
of PSLRA.
Table 2: Number of Cases in Sample Subject to Different Pleading
Standards

(1) Silicon GraphicsStandard
(2) Intermediate Standard
(3) Second Circuit Standard
(4) Post-1995, But Before Circuit Ruled on
Pleading Standard
(5) Pre-PSLRA Cases (Filed Before 1996)

88
101
105
269

Percent
of Total
12.5
14.4
15.0
38.3

139

19.8

Total

702

100.0

Types of Pleading Standard

# of Cases

With this general overview of the sample in mind, we begin our
analysis of forum shopping by examining how frequently plaintiffs'
counsel seeks to file securities fraud class actions in jurisdictions other
than the one where the corporation's headquarters is located. Table 3
contains three panels: Panel A presents data on the pre-PSLRA cases in
our sample, Panel B covers the post-PSLRA cases, and Panel C reports
the cases in our sample that were decided by one of the circuits after it
issued a post-PSLRA decision selecting a fraud-pleading standard for
securities fraud class actions. We explain the construction of this panel
below.
Table 3: Cases Filed in/out of Defendant Corporation's Home Circuit
Panel A: Pre-PSLRA Cases
# of Cases
Cases Filed in Circuit of
Incorporation

91

Percent of
Total
84.3

Cases Filed Outside Circuit of
Incorporation

17

15.7

Total

108

100.0
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Panel B: Post-PSLRA Cases
# of Cases

Cases Filed in Circuit of
Incorporation

398

Percent of
Total
82.2

Cases Filed Outside Circuit of
Incorporation

86

17.8

Total

484

100.0

Panel C: Post-Circuit Decision on Pleading Standard
Cases Filed Away
Percent
from Home Circuit
Home Circuit with
11
13.4
Silicon GraphicsStandard
Home Circuit with
14
13.9
Intermediate Standard
Home Circuit with
Second Circuit Standard

9

14.1

Total

34

13.8

Beginning with Panels A and B of Table 3, we see that the
overwhelming percentage of cases is filed in the defendant
corporation's home circuit, both pre- and post-PSLRA. In fact, we find
no statistically significant differences between the two sets of data.6 6
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that we have heard from
plaintiffs' attorneys who tell us that they rarely seek to file in other
jurisdictions because they do not want to have their case transferred to
the MDL panel and subjected to lengthy delays resulting from motions
to transfer the litigation back to the corporation's home circuit. Overall,
it does not appear that the PSLRA had any significant effect on this
trend.
Even though most cases are filed in the corporation's home circuit,
it is possible that the pleading standards in different jurisdictions matter
for those cases that are filed in other jurisdictions. In order to
determine if the pleading standards matter in this choice, we divide our
66.
Applying a Pearson chi-square test to the difference in percentage of cases
filed away from home jurisdictions during pre- and post-PSLRA periods results in a
chi-square value of 0.25, and p value of 0.61. These numbers do not reject the null
hypothesis of equality between the two time periods.

HeinOnline -- 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 444 2009

2009:421

Differences in PleadingStandards

445

sample into five groups according to the pleading standard applied by
the circuit where the suit was filed. In particular, we code cases that
were filed in the Ninth Circuit after July 2, 1999, when that court
adopted this pleading standard, as the "Silicon GraphicsStandard"; all
cases filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits after their
67
respective adoption date of this pleading standard as the "Intermediate
Standard"; and all cases filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits after their respective adoption
date of this standard,68 as the "Second Circuit Standard." The
remaining cases are placed into two other categories, the first

containing all cases that were filed after 1995 (i.e., post-PSLRA) but

before the presiding circuits had formally adopted a pleading standard,
and the second one with all cases that were filed during the pre-PSLRA
period (prior to January 1, 1996).
In Panel C of Table 3, we divide the cases filed outside of the
corporation's home jurisdiction according to the pleading standards
adopted by the home circuits. On average, we find about 14 percent of
these cases are filed in other jurisdictions with minor (and insignificant)
deviations among the different groupings.69

The adoption dates are October 8, 1999, for the First Circuit, see Greebel
67.
v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); December 22, 2003, for the
Fourth Circuit, see Ottmann v. HangerOrthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F. 3d 338, 344 (4th
Cir. 2003); September 25, 2001, for the Fifth Circuit, see Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc.,
267 F.3d 400, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2001); May 31, 2001, for the Sixth Circuit, see Helwig
v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001); January 25, 2006, for the Seventh
Circuit, see Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006);
September 7, 2001, for the Tenth Circuit, see City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos.,
Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2001); and September 3, 1999, for the
Eleventh Circuit, see Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282-83 (11th
Cir. 1999).
The adoption dates are June 21, 2000, for the Second Circuit, see Novak
68.
v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2nd Cir. 2000); June 17, 1999, for the Third Circuit,
see In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999); and
October 25, 2001, for the Eighth Circuit, see Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2001).
For Part C of Table 3, applying a Pearson chi-square test for the
69.
difference in percentage of cases filed away from home jurisdiction reveals a chi-square
value of 0.014, and p value of 0.99. These numbers do not suggest that the percentage
of cases filed away from the home jurisdiction is significantly different among home
jurisdictions with different pleading standards.
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III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: EVIDENCE THAT CLASS-ACTION LAWYERS
ARE NOT LEMMINGS

Of course, the pleading standards for fraud are not the only
variables that influence filing venue choices. We need to also consider a
range of other variables that might potentially influence this decision,
such as the magnitude of the losses suffered by the class, the presence
of a parallel SEC investigation into the violation alleged in the class
action, and the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff. We obtained
information relevant to these variables from a variety of sources. To
obtain the identity of the suit's plaintiff, and whether there was a
parallel SEC enforcement action, we used court filings, the federal
courts' electronic filing service (PACER), and Lexis-Nexis databases.
We then estimated the amount of damages suffered by the class during
the class period, which we call provable losses, using the methodology
that was in our earlier analysis of provable losses in securities class
actions.70

An especially important variable is whether the suit's plaintiff is a
financial institution. As mentioned above, one innovation in the PSLRA
was the introduction of a mechanism whereby the court selects a lead
plaintiff from competing petitioners. We coded the cases according to
their lead plaintiff types; we coded any financial institution in the
classic sense of an insurance company, bank, pension fund, mutual
fund, endowment, or foundation as "Institutional Investors." The
largest group of institutional lead plaintiffs in our sample are pension
funds (including labor-union pension funds).
A. Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables
Table 4 provides information about the distribution of institutional
lead plaintiffs in our sample. Several studies have found that
institutional lead plaintiffs correlate with greater settlement sizes.7' This
means that we need to determine if institutional lead plaintiffs are more
likely to have appeared in some of the categories within our sample. In
fact, it seems that institutional lead plaintiffs appear in a greater
percentage of the more recent cases in our sample, namely those
captured in categories 1, 2, and 3. The Ninth Circuit cases have the

70.
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:
An EmpiricalInquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737 (2003).
71.
See Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead
PlaintiffProvision of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
869, 885 (2005); Cox & Thomas, Does the PlaintiffMatter?, supra note 8, at 1624,
1630-32; Perino, supra note 7, at 14.
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highest percentage of institutional lead plaintiffs appearing in them,
while the Intermediate Standard cases show the lowest of these three
categories. The disparity in institutional presence in different categories
will be controlled for in our subsequent regression analysis.72
Table 4: Cases with Institutional Lead Plaintiffs
# of Cases

Percent

(1) Silicon GraphicsStandard

44

50.0

(2) Intermediate Standard

35

34.7

(3) Second Circuit Standard

46

43.8

Types of Pleading Standard

Next, we look at the presence of a parallel SEC investigation. A
substantial number of the defendants in the private securities fraud class
actions in our sample were also subject to a parallel SEC enforcement
action over the same allegations. Earlier research found that the
presence of a parallel SEC action results in greater settlements in
private actions against the same defendant. 3 This may lead plaintiffs'
counsel to seek to file in the defendant corporation's home jurisdiction
because it does not wish to see higher-valued cases tied up in the MDLpanel process. Therefore, we examine whether there are significant
differences in the presence of these enforcement actions across our
sample. Table 5 outlines the data on this question for our sample.
Table 5: Cases with Parallel SEC Actions
# of Cases

Percent

21

23.9

(2) Intermediate Standard

22

21.8

(3) Second Circuit Standard

22

21.0

Types of Pleading Standard
(1) Silicon Graphics Standard

Again, there is only one observation to compare in each category, so we
72.
cannot run significance tests on these differences.
Cox & Thomas, supra note 70, at 763.
73.
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In terms of SEC investigations, categories 1-3 have roughly the
same percentages of cases, with parallel private and SEC actions, with
all of them within the range of 21-24 percent.
Next, we turn to estimated provable losses. Larger provable
losses, our surrogate for the possible losses suffered by the class, have
been found to be correlated with bigger cash settlements in earlier
research.7 4 Intuitively, this result makes sense, as we would expect
larger investor losses to lead to bigger settlements by defendant firms if
the merits of securities fraud class actions matter.
Table 6 presents our data on estimated provable losses for the
cases in our sample. The differences between the means and medians of
categories 1, 2, and 3 are not statistically significant.7 5
Table 6: Estimated Provable Loss ($ Million)
Types of Pleading Standard

Mean

Median

948

150

# of
Cases
84

(2) Intermediate Standard

1,409

158

97

(3) Second Circuit Standard

2,041

190

99

All Cases

1,526

162

280

(1) Silicon GraphicsStandard

Summarizing these preliminary statistics, we find that there are no
significant differences between the cases in our sample in categories 1,
2, and 3. In other words, the descriptive statistics in Tables 1-6 do not
generally show large differences in the cases decided under the three
different pleading standards adopted by the different circuits. To try to
better determine why plaintiffs' counsel may seek to file cases outside
of the defendant corporation's home jurisdiction, we must resort to
multiple regression analysis.
B. MultivariateAnalysis
We turn next to multiple regression analysis to examine why
plaintiffs' counsel may seek to file securities fraud class actions outside
of the defendant's home jurisdiction. We are particularly interested in

74.
Cox & Thomas, Does the PlaintiffMatter?, supranote 8, at 1631.
75.
A t-test for difference in the mean and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for
difference in the median failed to reject the null hypothesis of equivalence.
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determining whether differences in the pleading standards for fraud lead
to more forum shopping. As we discussed earlier, the Ninth Circuit has
the most stringent standard during the time period that we are
investigating. Thus, if it is true that the pleading standards are an
important influence on the choice of venue, we would expect to see
more forum shopping in the Ninth Circuit as compared to the most
lenient pleading standard in the Second Circuit. Similarly, the
intermediate standard for pleading scienter is stricter than that used in
the Second Circuit, once again leading us to expect relatively greater
forum shopping in that jurisdiction than in the Second Circuit if
pleading standards are an important determinant of venue.
To test this hypothesis, we use multiple regression analysis where
the dependent variable is whether the plaintiffs have filed their
complaint away from the home jurisdiction of the defendant
corporation."6 This is a logit regression as the dependent variable can
take only two values: 1 if it is filed outside the defendant corporation's
home circuit, and 0 otherwise. Because the Second Circuit standard for
pleading fraud is the most lenient of the three possible standards, we
use it as the default standard. This means that the coefficients on the
two independent variables for different pleading standards-the Silicon
Graphics Standard (pleading standard 1) and the Intermediate Standard
(pleading standard 2)-should tell us the effect on forum selection of
these higher pleading standards. A positive and significant coefficient
on one of these variables would be interpreted as indicating that the
pleading standard did lead to an increased likelihood that the plaintiffs'
counsel would file the case in another jurisdiction. We also include
several independent variables in order to control for factors that have
been found to affect, or theorized to affect, settlement values. The
importance of including this set of independent variables is to control
for other factors, such as estimated damages, that might affect forum
choice. Table 7 below shows these results.

For statistical reasons, we use a log transformation of some of the
76.
independent variables. This helps to reduce the impact of outliers in the data on the
results of the estimation.
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Table 7: Multivariate Regression on Forum Shopping
Parameter

Coefficient

Intercept

0.74

Home Circuit with Silicon
GraphicsStandard
Home Circuit with

Standard

Wald Chi-

Error

Square

1.35

0.30

0.58

-0.09

0.58

0.02

0.88

0.28

0.55

0.25

0.61

Log (Provable Loss)

-0.24

0.11

4.47**

0.03

Parallel SEC Action

-1.08

0.64

2.80*

0.09

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

0.28

0.46

0.36

0.55

Pr > ChiSq

Intermediate Standard

* Significant at 10% level.

** Significant at 5% level. The Cox and Snell R-square statistic for goodness of fit
is 0.036."

The coefficients on both the independent variables "Home Circuit
with Silicon GraphicsStandard" and "Home Circuit with Intermediate
Standard" are insignificant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the fraud-pleading standards are not an important factor in plaintiffs'
counsel's decision about when to file cases in jurisdictions other than
the corporation's home circuit. However, we do see negative and
significant coefficients on the variables for estimated losses and the
presence of an SEC enforcement action. The former result is consistent
with the possibility that plaintiffs' counsel is more likely to file lowvalue cases outside of the defendant corporation's home jurisdiction
when the stakes in the case are relatively small, perhaps reflecting a
cost-benefit analysis in favor of litigating the case where it is more
convenient to the plaintiff or her counsel. In this regard, of the thirtyfour cases shown in Table 3 Panel C that were filed outside of the
defendant's home jurisdiction, fourteen were filed in jurisdictions in
which at least one of the plaintiffs' law firms was headquartered.
Convenience for the plaintiffs in legal representation appears to be an

77.
The relatively low value for the goodness of fit in this equation suggests
that the regression results would benefit from the inclusion of further control variables
such as proxies for case quality. Unfortunately, to date we and other researchers in the
field have been unable to come up with good proxy variables for case strength. For
further discussion of the Cox and Snell R-square statistic, see D.R. Cox & E.J. SNELL,
ANALYSIS OF BINARY DATA (2d ed. 1989).
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important factor in forum selection for these cases, as nine out of
fourteen cases were filed in the jurisdiction in which the home office of
the lead law firm was located. We would also suspect that for low-value
cases, defendants might be more reluctant to engage in costly
jurisdictional battles because the legal fees involved might well exceed
the costs of a small settlement. Thus, the defendants might have
financial incentives to concede the venue battle in the expectation of a
quick and easy settlement of the case.
The presence of an SEC investigation reduces the likelihood of
filing the case in a different jurisdiction. Since prior research has shown
that cases with parallel SEC investigations are likely to result in higher
settlements, 78 we interpret this result as consistent with plaintiffs
choosing to file high-value cases in the defendant corporation's home
jurisdiction to avoid any delays associated with procedural litigation
over forum choice and thereby speed the process toward a potentially
favorable resolution.
CONCLUSION

Our data supports the conclusion that differences across pleading
requirements do not support significant forum shopping. Overall, we
find very little forum shopping in the filing of federal securities class
actions, with almost 85 percent of cases being brought in the circuit of
the defendant firm's principal place of business. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that Tellabs will have much impact in reducing forum shopping
because there is very little of it going on. The data does, however, raise
questions whether other factors, specifically estimated losses and the
presence of an SEC enforcement action, have, at the margins, some
impact on the profile of cases that find their way into a particular
circuit.
We further conclude that Tellabs' s requirement that the inferences
are to be drawn not solely from the plaintiffs' allegations may lead to
greater uniformity across circuits in their individual applications of the
strong-inference standard. We have already seen some movement in
this direction by the Ninth Circuit in South Ferry L.P. # 2, discussed
above. Nevertheless, Tellabs in some ways was a missed opportunity
for the Supreme Court to bring uniformity into the interpretation of the
PSLRA. We began this Paper acknowledging the incantation of access
to justice and identifying some of the many ways that our laws further
this aspiration. Indeed, we can add to this brief list allowing, in the first
instance, that the plaintiff forum selection is a mechanism for providing
78.

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 70, at 763; Perino, supra note 14, at 962-
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the aggrieved access to a court.7 9 To be noted here is that forum

selection is the kinder, gentler expression for forum shopping. Courts

conveniently move between the two characterizations, supporting the
former and chastising those who engage in the latter. The reasons for

abhorring decisions that are deemed forum shopping are many: it
undermines substantive law, overburdens jurisdictions with the most
plaintiff-friendly approach, tends to place the suit in a locale that is
removed from the source of the contest so that the litigants' expenses
are greater, and perpetuates a negative perception of the fairness of the
legal system."0 While we find varying levels of persuasiveness with
each of these concerns, our focus is the first. In enacting the PSLRA,
Congress clearly sought not just a higher pleading standard, but one
that would be more uniform than existed in 1995 under the Rule's
particularity requirement, which, as pointed out earlier, elicited wideranging approaches among the circuits. Moreover, just a few years
after enacting the PSLRA, Congress was sufficiently disturbed by fears
that the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirement and the act's other
innovations were being circumvented by suits being filed in state rather
than federal courts, that it enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998,81 empowering the defendant to remove any

79.
See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REv. 333, 337,
364-68 (2006) (discussing forum selection in the context of a federal system that
anticipates that states will reflect in their laws different social choices, a rationale that is
greatly weakened when forum selection is driven by differing interpretations of a
federal statute); see, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984)
(upholding prosecution in a libel suit in the only possible state where the statute of
limitations had not run, reasoning, "Petitioner's successful search for a State with a
lengthy statute of limitations is no different from the litigation strategy of countless
plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or procedural rules or
sympathetic local populations"). For the view that appointed judges may be as
susceptible as elected judges to creating and nurturing procedural and substantive
opportunities for forum shopping, see Todd Zywicki, IsForum Shopping Corrupting
America's Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1156-57 (2006).
80.
See George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping- Why Doesn't
a Conservative Court ProtectDefendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 651 (1993) (pointing
out that forum shopping not only is counter to the reasoning of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but threatens a variety of conservative values such as
multiplicity of suits and manipulation of the judicial system); Note, Forum Shopping
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1677, 1695 (1990) (arguing that forum shopping is
but part of a continuum of activities within the legal system that crosses into the
impermissible area where it entails the plaintiff's manipulation of rules to defeat what is
perceived as the "correct" legal result).
81.
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(f (2006)). That uniformity of result that was sought is underscored by Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006), which upholds
removal and subsequent dismissal of a suit on behalf of a class that alleged it was duped
into not selling its shares by the defendants' false representations. Due to the fact that
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securities class action to federal court. The lack of uniformity in the
circuits' constructions of the PSLRA's pleading standard flaunts
Congress's clear mandate for uniformity. For these reasons, it was
incumbent upon the Supreme Court to deal definitively with the
pleading standard by, for example, identifying which of the three
disparate approaches it believed was consistent with the intent of
Congress. Tellabs did not do this. As a result, not only are the
substantive demands of the law frayed at the edges, but so is the likely
intent of Congress.

the class of defrauded investors were not actual sellers of shares, their suit could not
have been brought in federal court although a limited number of states recognized under
their laws suits by such "frustrated" sellers.
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